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Abstract
Many studies have found that discounting is hyperbolic rather than constant. Hyperbolic
discounting is becoming increasingly popular in economic applications. Most studies that
provide evidence in favor of hyperbolic discounting either are merely qualitative or they
depend on assumptions about, or parametric fittings of, utility functions. This paper
provides a quantitative measure for the degree of deviation from stationarity that can
overcome the problems mentioned. This measure, the hyperbolic factor, can easily be
calculated from data and does not require knowledge of the utility function. Moreover,
it provides simple preference foundations of the most popular discount functions. Thus,
the hyperbolic factor provides an easy tool for theoretical preference foundations, critical
empirical tests, and quantitative measurements of hyperbolic discounting.
Keywords: Hyperbolic discounting, hyperbolic factor, time preference
JEL classification: D90
1 Introduction
Since Samuelson’s (1937) introduction of constant discounted utility, this model has been
widely accepted as a normative and descriptive model of intertemporal choice. According
to general, possibly non-constant, discounted utility, a stream of outcomes is evaluated by
first determining the utility of every outcome, i.e. the value of the outcome would it have
been received immediately, and then multiplying each utility by a discount factor that
corresponds to the time-point of receipt. Constant discounting implies that a preference
between two streams of outcomes is not affected if all outcomes in both streams are delayed
by the same time interval.
Recently, there has been an increasing number of empirical studies suggesting that
discounting is not constant, including Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil (1989), Bleichrodt and
Johannesson (2001), Cairns and van der Pol (2000), Green, Fristoe, and Myerson (1994),
Kirby and Marakovic (1995), Mazur (1987, 2001), Read and Read (2004), Rodriguez and
Logue (1988), and Thaler (1981). If an early reward and another, later and larger reward
are perceived as being equivalent, then delaying both rewards equally will, for most people
and animals, result in a strict preference for the later and larger reward, revealing decreasing
impatience.
As a consequence of decreasing impatience, individuals’ preferences can be dynamically
inconsistent. Consider a person who prefers to receive two apples in one year plus one day
rather than one apple in one year, but prefers to receive one apple today rather than two
apples tomorrow (Thaler, 1981). This person is decreasingly impatient. If his preferences
between ‘today’ and ‘tomorrow’ remain the same for one year, then in one year from
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now, he will prefer to receive one apple on that day rather than two apples one day later.
Thus, his preferences between the two options will have changed over time. In this sense
decreasing impatience may be viewed as reflecting an irrationality.
An increasingly popular model that captures decreasing impatience is hyperbolic dis-
counting (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Harvey, 1986; Mazur, 1987). This model has
been used in many fields (Akerlof, 2002; Harris and Laibson, 2001; Krusell and Smith,
2003; Laibson, 1997; Luttmer and Mariotti, 2003; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; Thaler
and Benartzi, 2004). Most studies that provide empirical evidence in favor of hyperbolic
discounting assume a particular, often linear, utility function or first need to parametrically
fit utility. Thus, the quantitative evidence in favor of hyperbolic discounting is confounded
by assumptions about and parametric fittings of utility. Most qualitative studies in favor
of hyperbolic discounting only reject constant discounting and provide evidence in favor of
general decreasing impatience, not of hyperbolic discounting in particular.
This paper proposes a simple method to quantify the degree of deviation from station-
arity that does not need assumptions about or estimations of utility. That is, a measure of
decreasing impatience is introduced, the hyperbolic factor, which can easily be calculated
from data without knowledge of utility.
One approach to construct a measure of decreasing impatience would be to find out how
impatience changes over time. This would require knowledge of impatience at each time-
point, i.e. knowledge of the discount function. Then, to determine this discount function,
we would also need to know the utility function. It is, indeed, commonly believed in the
field that such a procedure should be followed. Surprisingly, as this paper shows, we do not
need to go through all these steps. In fact, measuring the degree of decreasing impatience
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is even easier than measuring the discount function.
Our method of measurement is similar to the utility measurement method of Wakker
and Deneffe (1996). There, choices between gambles under uncertainty are constructed
in such a manner that subjective probabilities or decision weights cancel from the equa-
tions, so that utilities can be measured without the need to measure subjective or weighted
probabilities. Similarly, this paper constructs choices between delayed outcomes in such
a manner that the absolute level of discounting and the utilities of outcomes cancel from
the equations, so that we can measure variations in impatience and, thus, degrees of irra-
tionality, without knowledge of utility or the absolute level of discounting.
As will be shown, the hyperbolic factor is a useful tool in the axiomatization of the var-
ious discount functions that exist today. A constant positive hyperbolic factor corresponds
to generalized hyperbolic discounting (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992). Quasi-hyperbolic
discounting holds if and only if the hyperbolic factor is equal to zero for all points in time
except the present (Phelps and Pollak, 1968). If, in addition, the hyperbolic factor is zero
in the present, then constant discounting holds. Thus, estimating the hyperbolic factor and
testing whether it is constant will be useful in testing which of the currently used models
fit empirical data best and in testing whether these existing models are appropriate at all
or whether different models need to be developed.
Prelec (2004) introduced another measure of decreasing impatience. Relative to the
hyperbolic factor, his measure is more complicated: it uses the second derivative of the
logarithm of the discount function, which can only be obtained after complex measurements
of discounting and utility. Moreover, his measure is not constant under hyperbolic discount-
ing. The difference between Prelec’s measure and the hyperbolic factor is analogous to the
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difference between the measure of absolute and that of relative risk aversion (Mas-Colell,
Whinston, and Green, 1995). While the former is most useful for CARA-utility (constant
absolute risk aversion), the latter is most useful for CRRA-utility (constant relative risk
aversion). Similarly, while the hyperbolic factor is most useful for hyperbolic discounting,
Prelec’s measure will be more useful for other discount functions. Finally, the hyperbolic
factor is model-free, i.e. it can also be used as a measure of decreasing impatience when
preferences cannot be represented by discounted utility. This is not the case for Prelec’s
measure, which essentially needs a discount function.
Section 2 defines the hyperbolic factor. This factor is applied to discounted utility in
Section 3. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Hyperbolic Factor Defined
Let X = Rm be a set of outcomes1 and T = R+ a set of time-points. A timed outcome
(t, µ) yields outcome µ at time t and nothing (= 0) at all other points in time, where
t = 0 corresponds to ‘today’. We examine preferences < over timed outcomes. The
relations 4,Â,≺,∼ are as usual. Preferences over outcomes are derived from preferences
over timed outcomes consumed today, i.e. χ < µ if and only if (0, χ) < (0, µ).
We assume that < is a weak order, i.e < is complete ((s, µ) < (t, χ) or (t, χ) < (s, µ) for
all µ, χ ∈ X and s, t ∈ T , possibly both) and transitive. Preferences are monotonic
if χ < µ implies (t, χ) < (t, µ) for every t ∈ T , and χ Â µ implies (t, χ) Â (t, µ)
1 All results in this paper remain valid if X is a connected topological space containing a reference outcome
‘nothing.’ X can, for instance, be any convex subset of Rm containing zero, or a set of non-quantified
health states.
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for every t ∈ T . Preferences are impatient if for every s < t, χ Â 0 implies (s, χ) Â
(t, χ) and χ ≺ 0 implies (s, χ) ≺ (t, χ). Preferences are continuous if for every (t, χ)
the sets {(s, µ) ∈ T × X | (s, µ) < (t, χ)} and {(s, µ) ∈ T × X | (s, µ) 4 (t, χ)} are closed.
Throughout this paper we assume that preferences constitute a continuous, monotonic,
and impatient weak order.
Consider two equivalent timed outcomes (s, µ) ∼ (t, χ), with s < t. Then we have
either χ Â µ Â 0 or χ ≺ µ ≺ 0 (µ is ‘moderate’ and χ is ‘extreme’). If the outcome µ
is delayed by an interval τ, then stationarity implies that the outcome χ should also be
delayed by τ in order to maintain indifference. Thus, under stationarity (s, µ) ∼ (t, χ)
implies (s+ τ, µ) ∼ (t+ τ, χ). Stationarity reflects constant impatience.
The preference relation < exhibits decreasing impatience if for all s < t, τ ∈ T , (i)
χ Â µ Â 0 and (s, µ) ∼ (t, χ) imply (t + τ, χ) < (s + τ, µ), and (ii) χ ≺ µ ≺ 0 and
(s, µ) ∼ (t, χ) imply (t + τ, χ) 4 (s + τ, µ); increasing impatience holds if the implied
preferences are always the reverse. Thus, with decreasing impatience, when we consider
two equivalent timed outcomes, then delaying both outcomes equally will result in less
distinction between the time-points, and, thus, more preference for the timed outcome
with the preferred outcome. In this sense, decreasing impatience reflects that a time
difference becomes decreasingly important as it lies farther in the future. Assume another
preference relation <∗, which also is a continuous, monotonic and impatient weak order.
Preferences <∗ exhibit more decreasing impatience than < if for all s < t, τ, σ ∈ T and
µ  χ, (i) χ∗ Â∗ µ∗ Â∗ 0, (s, µ) ∼ (t, χ), (s+σ, µ) ∼ (t+ τ, χ), and (s, µ∗) ∼∗ (t, χ∗) imply
(t+ τ, χ∗) <∗ (s+ σ, µ∗), and (ii) χ∗ ≺∗ µ∗ ≺∗ 0, (s, µ) ∼ (t, χ), (s+ σ, µ) ∼ (t+ τ, χ), and
(s, µ∗) ∼∗ (t, χ∗) imply (t+ τ, χ∗) 4∗ (s+ σ, µ∗) (Prelec, 2004).
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Consider again two equivalent timed outcomes (s, µ) ∼ (t, χ) with s < t. Assume that
(s+σ, µ) ∼ (t+τ, χ). Decreasing (increasing) impatience implies that τ−σ > 0 (τ−σ < 0).
An obvious measure of decreasing impatience is, therefore, τ −σ. This measure τ −σ, how-
ever, will depend on s, t, σ, µ, and χ, and will be hard to compare across different outcomes
and time-points. The main purpose of this paper is to propose a transformation of this
measure that is better suited as a measure of impatience, and that can be compared more
easily across different outcomes and time-points. This proposed measure, the hyperbolic
factor, is defined next. It is just as easily observable from preferences as τ−σ itself. Unlike
τ − σ, however, it will be constant, i.e. independent of s, t, σ, µ and χ, for all hyperbolic
discounting models currently used in the literature, as we will see in Section 3. Outcomes
µ, χ ∈ X and time-points s, t, σ, τ ∈ T , with s < t, τ > 0, form an indifference pair if
(s, µ) ∼ (t, χ) and (s+ σ, µ) ∼ (t+ τ, χ). (1)
Definition 2.1
For every indifference pair as in eq. 1 the hyperbolic factor is defined as
τ − σ
tσ − sτ .
For general preferences, a hyperbolic factor may not always be defined for every outcome
χ and all s < t and τ > 0. For instance, there may be no µ and σ that satisfy eq. 1. Our
assumptions about preferences imply that such a case can never arise, so that a µ and σ
as described can always be found. This claim is formalized in the next theorem.
Theorem 2.2 For every χ  0, s < t, and τ > 0, there are a µ, and a unique σ such that
an indifference pair as in eq. 1 results.
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Now we can define the function H for every χ  0, s < t, and τ > 0, as
H(s, t, χ, τ) =
τ − σ
tσ − sτ ,
where σ is such that together with a µ and the arguments of H, it yields an indifference
pair as in eq. 1. The function H gives the hyperbolic factors. In general, H need not
always be regular, i.e. H is infinite if tσ = sτ, and negative in spite of strongly decreasing
impatience if tσ < sτ. Yet, as we will see later, for all discounted utility models popular in
the literature, regularity holds, i.e. for every indifference pair as in eq. 1 we have tσ > sτ .
Note that for every indifference pair, a hyperbolic factor can be calculated. From n
indifferences as in eq. 1 with varying time-points,
(
n
2
)
/2 hyperbolic factors can be calcu-
lated. Non-negative hyperbolic factors correspond to decreasing impatience. We will see in
Section 3 that hyperbolic discounting induces non-negative hyperbolic factors, and, thus,
decreasing impatience.
Theorem 2.3 Let regularity hold. Preferences < exhibit decreasing impatience if and only
if H ≥ 0. Preferences < exhibit increasing impatience if and only if H ≤ 0.
The hyperbolic factor also serves as a measure of decreasing impatience, as shown in the
next theorem. Thus, it properly captures Prelec’s (2004) relative decreasing impatience.
When we consider another preference relation <∗, then it is assumed that <∗ is a contin-
uous, monotonic and impatient weak order, and that the corresponding hyperbolic factors
are given by H∗(s, t, χ, τ).
Theorem 2.4 Let regularity hold. Preferences <∗ exhibit more decreasing impatience than
< if and only if H∗(s, t, χ∗, τ) ≥ H(s, t, χ, τ) for all s, t, τ, χ, χ∗.
7
Thus, we have shown that the hyperbolic factor is an appropriate model-free measure
of decreasing impatience that can easily be obtained from an indifference pair.
3 The Hyperbolic Factor and Discounted Utility
Discounted utility holds if there exist a discount function φ and a utility function u such
that preferences < can be represented by
DU(t, µ) = φ(t)u(µ),
where φ is continuous and strictly decreasing, φ(0) = 1, φ(t) > 0 for every t, and u is
continuous, u(0) = 0, and there is an outcome χ ∈ X with u(χ) 6= 0. Fishburn and
Rubinstein (1982) characterized discounted utility. In this section we will assume that
discounted utility holds. Thus, preferences still constitute a continuous, monotonic and
impatient weak order as in Section 2. We will not assume regularity, but instead derive it
later from other assumptions.
Under discounted utility, the hyperbolic factor is independent of the outcomes, as the
following theorem shows.
Theorem 3.1 Let discounted utility hold. Then H(s, t, χ, τ) is independent of χ.
Two decision-makers with different discount functions φ and φ∗ that are related by a
power transformation φ∗(t) = [φ(t)]c have equal hyperbolic factors, as stated in Observa-
tion 3.2. Thus, in order to measure deviations from stationarity, we do not even need to
know how much people discount in an absolute sense. This observation underlies the pos-
sibility to analyze decreasing impatience without a need to measure the discount function
or utility.
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Observation 3.2 Let discounted utility hold. Consider two discount functions φ and
φ∗ with corresponding H and H∗. If there is a c ∈ R such that φ∗(t) = [φ(t)]c then
H∗(s, t, χ∗, τ) = H(s, t, χ, τ) for every s, t, τ, χ, χ∗.
3.1 Constant Discounting
For a long time, constant discounting has been a traditional assumption in economics.
Preferences satisfy constant discounting if there is a constant discount factor δ such that
φ(t) = δt for every t. Constant discounting is equivalent to the hyperbolic factor always
being zero.
Theorem 3.3 The following two statements are equivalent under discounted utility.
(i) Preferences < satisfy constant discounting.
(ii) H(s, t, χ, τ) = 0 for all s, t, χ, τ.
3.2 Generalized Hyperbolic Discounting
Following up on the empirical studies that found violations of stationarity, Loewenstein
and Prelec (1992) introduced the generalized hyperbolic discount function, which is defined
by
φ(t) = (1 + ht)−r/h,
with h > 0, r > 0. Generalized hyperbolic discounting is equivalent to the hyperbolic factor
being a positive constant.
Theorem 3.4 The following two statements are equivalent under discounted utility.
9
(i) Preferences < satisfy generalized hyperbolic discounting φ(t) = (1 + ht)−r/h with para-
meter h > 0.
(ii) There is a constant h > 0 such that H(s, t, χ, τ) = h for all s, t, χ, τ.
Mazur (1987) tested a necessary condition for hyperbolic discounting that also did not
require knowledge of utility. We provide a testable condition that is not only necessary,
but also sufficient for hyperbolic discounting, as Theorem 3.4 shows.
3.3 Harvey Discounting
Harvey (1986) proposed a discount function given by
φ(t) = (1 + t)−r.
This Harvey discounting is equivalent to generalized hyperbolic discounting with a hyper-
bolic factor that equals one.
Theorem 3.5 The following two statements are equivalent under discounted utility.
(i) Preferences < satisfy Harvey discounting.
(ii) H(s, t, χ, τ) = 1 for all s, t, χ, τ.
3.4 Mazur Discounting
Mazur (1987) proposed a discount function given by
φ(t) = (1 + ht)−1.
This Mazur discounting is equivalent to generalized hyperbolic discounting with r = h.
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It follows that the hyperbolic factor does not distinguish between the generalized hy-
perbolic discounting of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) and the model of Mazur (1987).
This is because the hyperbolic factor only restricts the parameter h and not the para-
meter r as we saw in Observation 3.2. Indeed, on our domain of timed outcomes the two
models cannot be distinguished, because they differ only regarding the absolute level of dis-
counting and not regarding the degree of decreasing impatience. This finding reflects once
more that changes in impatience and the corresponding irrationalities can be investigated
independently of the absolute level of discounting.
3.5 Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting
Phelps and Pollak (1968) introduced quasi-hyperbolic discounting, as used by Laibson
(1997) and many others. The quasi-hyperbolic discount function is given by
φ(t) =

1 if t = 0
βδt if t > 0.
for some β ≤ 1, and some δ > 0.
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting is equivalent to stationarity for all of the future except
the present.
Theorem 3.6 The following two statements are equivalent under discounted utility.
(i) Preferences < satisfy quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
(ii) H(s, t, χ, τ) = 0 for all s > 0, t, χ, τ.
Thus, when combined with Fishburn and Rubinstein’s (1982) preference foundation of
discounted utility, this section provided preference foundations for all currently popular
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discount models.
4 Conclusion
This paper has introduced the hyperbolic factor, a quantitative measure of decreasing
impatience, which can easily be obtained from an indifference pair. In addition to being
a simple measure, the hyperbolic factor is useful in characterizing all popular discount
models. Hyperbolic discounting holds if and only if the hyperbolic factor is constant and
positive. The discount function of Harvey applies if and only if the hyperbolic factor
is always equal to one. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting holds if and only if the hyperbolic
factor is equal to zero for all future points in time except the present. If, in addition, the
hyperbolic factor is equal to zero today, then constant discounting holds.
A direction for future research is to calculate hyperbolic factors from data, which will
illustrate how strong the evidence in favor of hyperbolic discounting is. A major advantage
of such future studies, in comparison to earlier ones, is that they will not be confounded
by assumptions about or estimations of instant utility functions. Testing whether hyper-
bolic factors are constant and positive will indicate whether hyperbolic discounting is the
appropriate alternative to constant discounting.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2.2
Consider s, t, χ, τ with 0 ≤ s < t, χ  0, and τ > 0. Assume that χ Â 0. By monotonicity
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and impatience we know that2
(s, 0) ∼ (t, 0) ≺ (t, χ) ≺ (s, χ).
By continuity and connectedness of Rm there must then be a µ with (s, µ) ∼ (t, χ) and
χ Â µ Â 0. Thus,
(s, µ) ∼ (t, χ) Â (t+ τ, χ) Â (t+ τ, µ).
By continuity there must then be a σ with (s + σ, µ) ∼ (t + τ, χ). By replacing all ‘Â’ by
‘≺’ and all ‘≺’ by ‘Â’, this reasoning shows that similar things hold for χ ≺ 0.
By monotonicity and impatience, µ is unique up to indifference and σ is unique. 2
Proof of Theorem 2.3
By regularity, we have H ≥ 0 if and only if τ − σ ≥ 0 for all indifference pairs as in eq. 1.
Thus, by Theorem 2.2, we have H ≥ 0 if and only if decreasing impatience holds. 2
Proof of Theorem 2.4
By regularity, we have H∗(s, t, χ∗, τ) ≥ H(s, t, χ, τ) for every s, t, τ, χ, χ∗ if and only if
σ∗ ≤ σ for all s < t, χ  0, τ > 0 with (s, µ) ∼ (t, χ), (s + σ, µ) ∼ (t + τ, χ) and
(s, µ∗) ∼∗ (t, χ∗), (s + σ∗, µ∗) ∼∗ (t + τ, χ∗), which, by impatience, holds if and only if <∗
exhibits more decreasing impatience than < . 2
2 By the definition of a timed outcome it follows that (s, 0) ∼ (t, 0) for every s, t.
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Proof of Theorem 3.1
Let H(s, t, χ, τ) = h and H(s, t, χ∗, τ) = h∗. Then there are µ, σ, µ∗, σ∗, with (s, µ) ∼ (t, χ),
(s+ σ, µ) ∼ (t+ τ, χ), (s, µ∗) ∼ (t, χ∗) and (s+ σ∗, µ∗) ∼ (t+ τ, χ∗). By discounted utility
it follows that
φ(s)u(µ) = φ(t)u(χ)
and
φ(s+ σ)u(µ) = φ(t+ τ)u(χ).
Therefore,
u(µ)
u(χ)
=
φ(t)
φ(s)
=
φ(t+ τ)
φ(s+ σ)
.
Similarly,
u(µ∗)
u(χ∗)
=
φ(t)
φ(s)
=
φ(t+ τ)
φ(s+ σ∗)
.
By impatience it then follows that σ∗ = σ and h = h∗. This proves our result.
A similar reasoning proves Observation 3.2. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.3
Let H(s, t, χ, τ) = 0 for all s, t, χ, τ. Then
(s, µ) ∼ (t, χ)
if and only if
(s+ τ, µ) ∼ (t+ τ, χ),
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i.e. stationarity holds. Thus, for every s, t, σ ∈ T ,
φ(s)
φ(t)
=
φ(s+ τ)
φ(t+ τ)
.
Therefore, by setting s = 0, for every t, τ ∈ T ,
φ(t)φ(τ) = φ(t+ τ).
By Cauchy’s functional equation it follows that there must be a c ∈ R such that φ(t) = ect
for every t ∈ T . Now let δ = ec. Then, φ(t) = δt. The converse follows easily. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.4
Let there be a constant h > 0 such that H(s, t, χ, τ) = h for all s, t, χ, τ. Assume that
u(µ) = φ(t)u(χ) and φ(σ)u(µ) = φ(t+ τ)u(χ),
with t > 0. Then we must have
τ − σ
tσ
= h.
Let k = 1+ ht. It follows that t+ τ = t+ kσ. Moreover, k is a constant that depends only
on t. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) showed that this implies that the discount function
is of the generalized hyperbolic form. Thus, there must be parameters h˜, r such that
φ(t) = (1 + h˜t)−r/h˜. It follows that h˜ = h. From the assumption that φ(·) is strictly
decreasing it follows that r > 0. This proves one direction of our result. The proof of the
other direction is straightforward. 2
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Proof of Theorem 3.5
Harvey discounting is equivalent to generalized hyperbolic discounting with h = 1. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.6
Let H(s, t, χ, τ) = 0 for all s > 0, t, χ, τ. Then for every s, t, σ ∈ T , with s, t > 0
φ(s)
φ(t)
=
φ(s+ σ)
φ(t+ σ)
.
Let s0 > 0. Define the function φ0 on T by φ0(t) = φ(t + s0)/φ(s0). Then for every
s, t, σ ∈ T ,
φ0(s)
φ0(t)
=
φ(s+ s0)
φ(t+ s0)
=
φ(s+ s0 + σ)
φ(t+ s0 + σ)
=
φ0(s+ σ)
φ0(t+ σ)
.
Moreover, φ0(0) = 1. By Cauchy’s functional equation it follows that there must be a
c0 ∈ R such that φ0(t) = ec0t for every t ∈ T . Therefore, φ(t + s0) = ec0tφ(s0) for every
t ∈ T . Thus, φ(t) = ec0(t−s0)φ(s0) for all t ≥ s0. Define δ0 = ec0 and β0 = e−c0s0φ(s0). Then
φ(t) = β0δ
t
0 for all t ≥ s0. Similarly, consider an s1 with 0 < s1 < s0 and with corresponding
β1 and φ1. It follows that for all t ≥ s0, φ(t) = β1δt1 = β0δt0, so β0 = β1 and δ0 = δ1. We
can continue this argument repeatedly.
Thus, letting β = β0 and δ = δ0 we obtain φ(t) = βδ
t for all t > 0. By definition we
have φ(0) = 1. 2
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